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Abstract
The fiscal rules set in the Treaty of Maastricht and in the Stability and Growth Pact have sometimes
been criticised as an excessively binding constraint for appropriate counter-cyclical action. The risk
that the rules may permanently reduce the public sector’s contribution to capital accumulation has
also been pointed out. In this framework, the adoption of a ‘golden rule’ has been suggested.
Starting from the recent debate, this paper tackles two questions: (a) the implications of the Pact for
public investment and (b) the pros and cons of introducing a golden rule in EMU’s fiscal
framework, given the objectives of low public debts and adequate margins for a stabilising
budgetary policy. The analysis suggests that the rules set in the Treaty and in the Pact may
negatively influence public investment spending. However, the golden rule, although intuitively
appealing, does not seem to be an appropriate solution to the problem.
JEL classification: H54, H6, E61.
I. INTRODUCTION
The slowdown in growth in 1998 and its possible implications for the level of
unemployment raised worries and doubts concerning the fiscal rules set in the
Treaty of Maastricht and in the Stability and Growth Pact. It has been argued
that these rules may represent an excessively binding constraint for appropriate
counter-cyclical action and that the attempt to reach rapidly a budget position
‘close to balance or in surplus’ may worsen the slowdown. The risk that the rules
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may permanently reduce the public sector’s contribution to capital accumulation
has also been pointed out.
In this framework, the adoption of a ‘golden rule’ has been suggested. The
rule would exclude investment spending from the computation of the fiscal
parameters relevant to the Excessive Deficits Procedure.
1 In the opinion of those
supporting the amendment, this would allow EU Member States to loosen their
fiscal stance while positively affecting long-run growth: debt finance would thus
not harm future generations.
Underlying the debate, there are several issues. It is important to separate
problems concerning the current economic situation from those concerning the
design of the EMU’s fiscal constitution per se. The solution to the potential
conflict between the objective of moving towards a close-to-balance position and
the need to avoid a worsening of short-term economic prospects may not require
changes to the rules set in the Treaty and in the Pact. Furthermore, the risk that a
revision of the rules could harm the credibility of the commitment to fiscal
sustainability, which in turn may prevent the adoption of the appropriate policy
mix, must be taken into account.
Also, the need to allow more room for counter-cyclical budgetary action and
the need to increase public investment should be dealt with separately. As to the
public sector’s contribution to capital accumulation, one cannot simply assume
that an increase in public investment spending is always superior to a cut in
taxes, an increase in outlays for human capital formation or a reduction in the
deficit.
Finally, it is necessary to evaluate whether the golden rule is consistent with
the objectives underlying present European fiscal rules.
2 These rules aim to
reduce the risk that unbalanced budgets in some Member States may harm other
members of the Union, and even endanger EMU, through financial instability
and inflationary pressures. The rules also aim to allow countries to adopt the
appropriate policy mix when dealing with both symmetric and asymmetric
shocks. The reduction of deficits and debts, necessary for reaching both
objectives, may find an obstacle in the golden rule, depending on the way the
rule is implemented.
Starting from the recent debate, this paper tackles two issues: (a) the
implications of the Pact for public investment and (b) the pros and cons of
introducing a golden rule in EMU’s fiscal framework, given the objectives of
low public debts and adequate margins for stabilisation policy. The analysis
suggests that the rules set in the Treaty and in the Pact may negatively influence
                                                                                                                                   
1This point of view is taken by Modigliani et al. (1998). Opinions in favour of some kind of golden rule have
also been expressed by European Commissioner Mario Monti. It should be noted that, when defining an
‘excessive deficit’, the Treaty does not discriminate between current and capital outlays; however, it provides
for the Commission’s Report on Excessive Deficits to take into account a list of relevant factors and, among
those, ‘whether government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure’ (article 104c(3)).
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public investment. However, the golden rule, although intuitively appealing,
does not seem to be an appropriate solution to the problem.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II examines the implications of a
balanced budget for public investment both in the long run, when the debt
reaches the new equilibrium level, and during the transition towards such
equilibrium. Section III reviews the empirical evidence on the link between fiscal
consolidations and reductions in public investment. Section IV reviews the
literature on the effects of public investment on growth in order to assess the
possible consequences of a reduction in investment spending. Section V
highlights the difficulty in reconciling different specifications of the golden rule
with EMU’s fiscal framework. Section VI summarises the main conclusions.
II. THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT
AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT
The achievement of budget positions ‘close to balance or in surplus’ implies that
most capital expenditure will have to be funded from current revenues. Hence it
will no longer be possible to spread the cost of an investment project over all the
generations of taxpayers who benefit from it. This has two main implications
which are analysed below:
•   there is a disincentive to undertake large projects producing deferred benefits
and entailing a significant gap between current revenues and current
expenditures;
•   the disincentive will be stronger while the deficit is being reduced:
3 the
above-mentioned gap will grow if the flow of investment stays unchanged;
the gap will remain larger than the initial level until the decline in interest
expenditure induced by the reduction of the debt equals the decline in the
deficit.
Concerning the first consequence, in Balassone and Franco (1999), we show
how the introduction of a deficit ceiling can imply a reduction in investment in a
two-period model where a policymaker with a finite horizon maximises
disposable income and the latter is positively affected by investment with a lag.
The finite horizon suggests a political economy interpretation of the result.
Without a ceiling, the policymaker, who cares about economic performance only
when he or she is in power, can run deficits and invest in the first period without
reducing disposable income. With a ceiling, investment will reduce disposable
income in the first period, and the policymaker invests less.
                                                                                                                                   
3The idea that investment is reduced more than other items during fiscal consolidations is largely shared in the
literature. For example, Oxley and Martin (1991) point to ‘the political reality that it is easier to cut back or
postpone investment spending than it is to cut current expenditure’ (p. 161); De Haan, Sturm and Sikken
(1996) argue that investment ‘[is] the least rigid component of expenditure’ (p. 108).Fiscal Studies
210
However, the introduction of a ceiling implies a reduction of investment also
in the case of a benevolent planner aiming to maximise social welfare. In Barro
(1979), given an expenditure profile, the efficiency loss caused by distortionary
taxation is minimised if the tax rate is constant (tax-smoothing). If a budget
constraint is introduced, indivisible investment projects may have welfare costs
(the tax profile is no longer smooth); if the expenditure profile is not given, these
costs may induce a reduction in investment.
Finally, since investments produce deferred benefits, the means of financing
them (tax rather than debt) also affect intergenerational equity. Tax financing
implies a welfare loss for the current generation and favours future ones: the
former fully pays for a project whose benefits will partly accrue to the latter.
When a budget constraint is introduced, it is then possible that voters will prefer
a reduction in capital expenditure to an increase in taxes or a reduction in current
outlays (from which they fully benefit).
The disincentive would mainly apply to projects with very uneven cost
distributions. With a homogeneous expenditure flow, the difference between tax
and debt financing is limited:
4 only those generations living when the earliest
projects are undertaken suffer a loss under tax finance; future generations will
have to pay more or less the same, be it to finance interest on past debt (while
new projects are financed via new debts) or to finance new projects (while past
ones have already been paid for by past generations).
The transition to a lower deficit level is equivalent to an expenditure peak. If
the flow of investment is unchanged, current generations will have to pay part of
the new projects (the whole if the budget is balanced) while also paying interest
on debts: taxes will have to be raised or current expenditures cut. For these
generations, the transition would be less burdensome if the level of investment
(producing deferred benefits) were reduced, so that a smaller tax increase (or
current outlays reduction) would be needed.
5
The problem can easily be seen with reference to the budget constraint:
(1) T + B = G = Cp + I(D) + K ⇒ T – Cp = K + I(D) – B
where T is taxes, B the deficit, G overall outlays (made up by interest I, other
current outlays Cp and investment K). The burden for current generations is
                                                                                                                                   
4Let us express all variables in real terms and assume that the deficit is equal to investment expenditure (I) and
constant as a ratio to GDP (Y): It/Yt = it = i ∀ t. If i is such that the debt (D) to GDP ratio converges (i.e. if i =
{g/(1+g)}d, where d = dt = Dt/Yt ∀ t and g is the growth rate of GDP), then since taxes (T) must equal interest
outlays (rDt–1, where r is the interest rate) plus primary current expenditure (C), we have Tt/Yt = rDt–1/Yt + Ct/Yt
= rDt–1/{(1+g)Yt–1} + Ct/Yt = {r/(1+g)}d + ct ∀ t, where ct = Ct/Yt. If the same level of i were to be financed by
taxes, we would have Tt/Yt = i + ct = {g/(1+g)}d + ct. The difference between the two cases once the debt ratio
is stable would then be negligible if r ≅  g (i.e. if the real interest rate were close to the real GDP growth).
5See Kitterer (1994) for an analysis based on an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model. The
Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands estimates that the shift from deficit to tax finance would entail a
welfare loss for current generations equal to 34 per cent of GDP (van Ewijk, 1997).Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’
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T–Cp, since they give up resources (T) in excess of the transfers and services that
they receive (Cp). This burden is compensated by the flow of services produced
by investment projects that were undertaken in the past and financed by deficit.
The burden is a positive function of interest payments (and hence of past debt,
D) and of present investment spending; it is reduced by the deficit, so that the
transition to a lower deficit implies an increase in the burden, which is higher the
higher are K and D; ceteris paribus, it will be higher in those countries where
deficit finance has also been used to pay for current expenditures.
The double burden issue is exemplified in Figure 1, which is drawn assuming
both nominal GDP growth rate and nominal interest rate at 5 per cent, and an
initial debt to GDP ratio at 60 per cent of GDP. The initial deficit ratio is 3 per
cent of GDP; thereafter, a balanced budget is attained. Three phases can be
identified:
1.  The first, labelled ‘steady state before the Pact’, is a situation in which the
overall deficit is constant at 3 per cent of GDP; this implies a balanced
primary budget and a constant debt to GDP ratio. The primary balance is
assumed to result from a 40 per cent revenue to GDP ratio, a 37 per cent
current primary expenditure ratio and a 3 per cent capital expenditure ratio.
There is a 3 per cent of GDP gap between revenues and current primary
expenditures (the light-shaded area), which is assumed to be balanced by the
flow of services produced by past public investments.
FIGURE 1






































2.  The second phase (‘transition’) opens with the abrupt reduction of the deficit
to zero. This is obtained via an increase of 3 percentage points of GDP in the
revenue ratio (a reduction in current primary outlays would have the same
effect
6). The gap between revenues and current primary outlays doubles. As
the debt ratio gradually declines, so do interest expenditures, and the revenue
ratio can slowly move back to 40 per cent. The additional burden induced by
the reduction of the deficit during the transition phase corresponds to the
dark-shaded triangle.
3.  The third phase (‘steady state after the Pact’) begins when the debt ratio and
interest expenditures are nil. The gap between revenues and current primary
outlays is again at 3 per cent, balanced again by the flow of services produced
by past investments.
The problems involved in the transition from deficit to tax financing of public
investment are similar to those involved in the transition from a pay-as-you-go to
a funded pension scheme.
7 In both cases, the burden on current generations
depends on the speed of the transition and on the stock of debt. In countries
where a shift to funded schemes is under way, the burdens determined by the two
transitions will be summed.
III. FISCAL CONSOLIDATION AND INVESTMENT REDUCTION:
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The link between fiscal consolidation and cuts in capital spending is confirmed
by the experience of EU countries. In 1992, the year of the Treaty, the deficit
ratio exceeded 3 per cent in nine countries. In 1997, for all these countries but
Greece the ratio was at or below the threshold; all had reduced the investment to
GDP ratio; all but Greece and the Netherlands had lowered the investment to
primary outlays ratio (Table 1). Over the same period, investment ratios
increased in three of the six countries that met the deficit criterion in 1992.
In some countries, the reduction of investment may reflect the privatisation
process or changes in the classification of public utilities and other units (from
general government to the private sector); for Austria, the latter factor accounts
for half of the reduction between 1993 and 1997. In the UK, the use of ‘public
finance initiatives’ (involving private capital in the realisation of projects of
public interest) may explain about one-third of the reduction in public
investment expenditure between 1993 and 1997. The contribution from sales of
public real estate, which are recorded as negative investment outlays by general
government, appears less relevant.
                                                                                                                                   
6If capital expenditures were reduced, the burden of transition would be shifted on to future generations who
would suffer from the lower accumulated stock of public capital.
7Budgetary problems involved in this second transition are analysed in Holzmann (1997).Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’
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TABLE 1






(% of primary outlays)
1992 1997 1992 1997 1992 1997
Italy 9.6 2.7 3.0 2.4 6.8 5.7
France 3.9 3.0 3.5 3.1 6.9 6.1
Germany 2.6 2.7 2.8 1.9 6.1 4.3
UK 6.2 1.9 2.1 1.1 5.2 3.0
Spain 3.8 2.6 4.1 3.1 9.7 7.9
Belgium 6.9 2.1 1.5 1.4 3.4 3.2
Denmark 2.1 –0.7 1.7 1.8 3.2 3.4
Greece 12.8 4.0 3.5 3.3 10.1 10.2
Ireland 2.5 –0.9 2.0 2.2 5.9 7.1
Luxemburg –0.8 –1.7 5.4 4.9 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 3.9 1.4 2.1 1.9 4.2 4.2
Portugal 3.0 2.5 3.8 4.3 10.7 10.9
Austria 2.0 2.5 3.3 2.6 6.9 5.3
Finland 5.9 0.9 3.5 2.7 6.0 5.5
Sweden 7.7 0.8 2.7 2.4 4.3 4.2
Source: ESA79 data.
Similar evidence emerges when considering data from the last two decades.
Between 1980 and 1997, we identify 32 episodes of lasting and significant
budget consolidation in EU countries: in 25 cases, the ratio of investment to
GDP decreased; in 23, the ratio of investment to primary outlays decreased
(Table 2).
8
With the exception of Greece, Portugal and Spain, which, however, benefited
from particular conditions (for example, EU support for infrastructure
development), the ratios of investment to GDP and to primary outlays decreased
in the EU between the first half of the 1980s and the 1995–97 period. With the
exception of Greece, the larger reductions occurred in high-debt countries
(Belgium, Ireland and Italy), where the investment to GDP ratio declined from
an average of 3.7 per cent in 1980–84 to 2.3 per cent in 1995–97; at the same
time, the deficit to GDP ratio decreased from 9.8 per cent to 4.2 per cent. In the
rest of the EU, while the deficit decreased from 3.9 per cent to 3.4 per cent of
GDP, investment was reduced from 3.2 per cent to 2.6 per cent (Figure 2). A
similar picture emerges for the investment to primary outlays ratios (Figure 3).
                                                                                                                                   
8By ‘lasting and significant improvement’, we mean a reduction of the deficit ratio for at least two years and by
at least 1.5 percentage points of GDP. Luxemburg is not included in the analysis. Similar evidence is also
reported by Roubini and Sachs (1989) and by De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) with reference to different
time-spans and using a sample of OECD countries.Fiscal Studies
214
The growth of deficit and investment in low-debt countries in the first half of the
1990s may reflect expansionary policies implemented in response to a cyclical
downswing: this opportunity was not available to countries where fiscal
consolidation was still under way. During the 1990s, the investment to GDP ratio
was significantly lower in high-debt countries than in low-debt countries.
TABLE 2
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FIGURE 2
































Average, high-debt countries (Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Italy)
Average, other EU countries
Source: ESA79 data.
FIGURE 3
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Average, other EU countries
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF A REDUCTION IN PUBLIC INVESTMENT
EXPENDITURE
The reduction in public investment is a problem if, as implicitly assumed in the
previous sections, it reduces the productive and growth potential of the economy.
However, the empirical evidence on the effects of public investment is not
unequivocal.
9
Various techniques have been used to measure the impact of public capital.
Direct estimation of a production function dates back to Mera (1973) and Ratner
(1983).
10 Using this approach, Aschauer (1989) revived the debate. He found
that non-military public capital is a significant input to a national production
function for the US and that the implied marginal product of public capital is
high; he argued that the slowdown in public capital growth in the US during the
1970s and 1980s explains the decline in productivity growth that occurred over
the same period. Aschauer’s work spurred a literature aimed at refining his
method and results (see the reviews in Eberts (1990), Munnel (1992) and
Gramlich (1994)). Many studies initially confirmed (in sign if not in value)
Aschauer’s results also using US state-level panel data. However, subsequent
efforts have found that, when controlling for state fixed effects, the positive
infrastructure–output link found in OLS and random effects models disappears
(Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Garcia-Milà, McGuire and Porter, 1996; Kelejian and
Robinson, 1997); similar results have been obtained by Evans and Karras (1994)
using a panel of seven OECD countries.
11
The statistical measurement of the effect of public capital on private
production encounters several problems: the causality direction is difficult to
assess, there is potential endogeneity of inputs and outputs, time-series may not
                                                                                                                                   
9The implications of deficit financing of public investment also raise doubts from a theoretical point of view.
Among the relevant issues, the possibility of crowding-out should be mentioned. A review of the theory is
provided by Dalamagas (1995).
10Cost function estimations have also been used (see the references in Dalenberg, Partridge and Rickman
(1998)). In Dalenberg et al. (1998), the analysis focuses on the relationship between public infrastructure and
private employment using a labour demand function: ‘public highway capital is significantly related to state
employment growth in all specifications’ (p. 46). Also, the effects of public investment on private investment
have been investigated: Erenburg (1993) finds a significant positive relationship between the two variables at
state level for the US. Overall, the results are ambiguous.
11The production function method is based on an aggregate production function where public capital (G) is a
factor of production (Q) together with private capital (K) and labour (L):
Q = MFP ×  f(K,L,G)
where MFP (multifactor productivity) is the residual after subtracting from the growth in total output the direct
contributions from capital and labour. Subsequent to the specification of the function (usually a Cobb–
Douglas) and of the error term (a typical structure for a panel would be ε it = fi+gt+mit where f is a country-
specific effect, g is a time-specific component and m is an identically and independently distributed error), a
regression analysis is conducted to check whether the coefficient of G is positive and significant. The literature
shows that the results of the analysis are strongly dependent upon the assumptions concerning f and g;
specifically, the presence of significant productivity effects from public capital seems to depend on the
hypothesis that f = 0 ∀ i.Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’
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be stationary, the proper treatment of fixed and random effects is an unsettled
issue, and the measurement of the stock of public capital or of the net addition to
the stock generated by the annual flow of public investment is often inadequate
(see the review in Hurst (1994)).
To this effect, the Italian experience clearly indicates that the ratio of
investment to GDP is not a good indicator of variations in the stock of public
capital: the Italian ratio has long been among the highest in western countries
without improving Italy’s relative position in terms of infrastructures.
12 Besides
the obvious issue of amortisation, the result may also reflect improper
management or any other source of inefficiency. Furthermore, a large part of the
infrastructures presumably affecting productivity and growth is not included
among general government investment as the institutions responsible for such
infrastructures are not part of general government (this is frequently the case for
energy, telecommunications and railways).
Hence, while there is a consensus that private sector production of goods and
services depends crucially upon an adequate infrastructure of roads, electricity,
telecommunications, water and other similar facilities, the public investment to
GDP ratio cannot be the sole indicator of year-to-year changes in the stock of
public capital.
The problem of efficiency of public investment is also stressed by Girard,
Gruber and Hurst (1994 and 1995), who argue that ‘the different quality of
investment has played a significant role in the different economic growth
experiences of the EU, Japan and USA’ (1995, p. 731) and by Girard and Hurst
(1994), who argue that a suboptimal public capital stock is consistent with a too-
high rate of public capital accumulation, i.e. ‘that there is some maximum rate at
which viable projects can be prepared’ (p. 53).
13
V. WHICH ‘GOLDEN RULE’ FOR THE MONETARY UNION?
The usefulness of a dual budget has been long debated, since the 1930s, when a
dual budget was proposed in order to foster the acceptance of using public debt
to finance investment. It is still an unsettled issue, which has been tackled in
different ways in different countries and at different times.
14 Sweden, for
example, introduced the dual budget in 1937 and suppressed it in 1980.
                                                                                                                                   
12Comparative analyses show that the stock of infrastructure in Italy is currently 10 per cent lower than the EU
average; a similar gap was estimated for the mid-1980s. See, for example, Pontolillo (1998).
13De la Fuente (1997), using a sample of OECD countries, finds that the elasticity of GDP with respect to
investment expenditure decreases rapidly as outlays increase and can even assume negative values as a
consequence of distortions and crowding-out induced by public intervention.
14Proposals to exclude capital outlays from the operating budget and to include depreciation of government
capital stock date back at least to Musgrave (1939). The issue is reviewed, for example, in Goode and
Birnbaum (1955), Steve (1972), Premchand (1983), Poterba (1995) and Robinson (1998 and 1999).Fiscal Studies
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The separation of current and capital operations is attractive in various
respects. One of its main advantages is the possibility of spreading the costs of
durables over the years during which they will be used. However, it has been
noted that it is necessary to be careful about which expenditures should be
included in the capital account, otherwise the dual budget would result ‘... in a
preference for expenditures on physical assets rather than greater spending for
intangibles such as health or education’ (Colm and Wagner, 1963, p. 125).
Clearly, there are current expenditures, such as those increasing human capital,
that can give a relevant contribution to growth.
15 Moreover, the possibility of
borrowing, without strict limits, in order to finance investments can lower the
attention paid when evaluating the costs and benefits of each project. Contrary to
what happens in the private sector, there would be no mechanism to penalise
public institutions investing in low-revenue projects.
Besides taking into account the above-mentioned aspects,  the proposal to
introduce such a rule in EMU’s fiscal framework must be evaluated with regard
to its consistency with the objectives of EMU’s fiscal rules and to its impact
upon the effectiveness of the surveillance procedure set to safeguard their
enforcement.
The reference values and the targets defined in the Maastricht Treaty and in
the Stability and Growth Pact do not distinguish between current and capital
outlays. The latter are only mentioned among the other relevant factors for
evaluating excessive deficits (article 104c(3)); investment expenditure must be
specified in the Convergence Programmes that each Member State will submit
annually to the Council and the European Commission.
The objectives of the Treaty and the Pact are a sound fiscal stance (to this
end, quantitative limits are set for the deficit and the debt to GDP ratios) and
sufficient room for counter-cyclical action (to this end, given the above-
mentioned limits, a medium-term target of a budget position close to balance or
in surplus is set).
16
The Ecofin Council has subsequently made clear that the medium-term target
is to be obtained ‘over the cycle’; in other words, it may be thought of as
applying to structural budgets, around which automatic stabilisers will be
operating and, if necessary, discretionary interventions will be made.
17 The lower
                                                                                                                                   
15The inclusion in the capital account (which can be debt-financed) of all expenditures contributing to human
capital accumulation would imply high levels of deficits and pose serious classification problems. One should
also take into account that part of expenditures replaces existing capital. Modigliani and Padoa Schioppa
Kostoris (1998) estimate that, in Italy, gross public expenditure for ‘development’ amounts to 15 per cent of
GDP; the corresponding net figure would be 5 per cent.
16For a review of the justifications put forward for the Pact and for an analysis of its potential macroeconomic
implications, see European Commission (1997), Artis and Winkler (1997) and Eichengreen and Wyplosz
(1998).
17This interpretation is supported by the Council Resolution of 16–17 June 1997, by the Council Regulation no.
1466/97 of 7 July 1997 and by the Opinion of the Monetary Committee of 12 October 1998 as endorsed by the
Council.Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’
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this budget balance with respect to the 3 per cent threshold, the wider the
margins for counter-cyclical policy. The actual value set by each country for the
medium-term target depends on three elements: the size of foreseeable
recessions; the elasticity of the budget to the cycle; and the size of discretionary
interventions that may be needed to supplement automatic stabilisers.
18
Countries with debt ratios above 60 per cent of GDP should also take into
account the need to decrease this ratio, at a satisfactory pace, towards the
threshold. Moreover, an increase in the debt ratio during recessions should be
avoided.
19
Some indications can be drawn from the analysis of past output gaps.
According to the European Commission’s estimates, over the period 1960–97,
the maximum output gap among EU Member States was, on average, 4
percentage points. Budget elasticity ranged from 0.4 for Greece to 0.9 in
Sweden; on average, it was 0.6. For output gaps no larger than in the past, in
most EU countries, a cyclically adjusted budget between 0 and 1 per cent of
GDP would allow full operation of automatic stabilisers with no risk of
breaching the 3 per cent threshold (Buti, Franco and Ongena, 1997 and 1998).
Countries with cycles of lower amplitude and lower budget elasticity could stay
closer to the upper part of this ‘safety zone’.
A stylised version of the EMU fiscal constitution can be drawn as follows.
The reference parameter is general government deficit (DEF); the parameter is
subject to an upper ceiling (3 per cent of GDP) and to a medium-term objective
of a position close to balance or in surplus (to allow stabilisation policy without
breaching the upper ceiling):
(2) (DEF/GDP)t ≤  0.03   ∀ t
(DEFs/GDP)t ∈  (0.00, 0.01)   ∀ t
where DEFs is the structural deficit and the medium-term objective of a position
close to balance or in surplus is operationalised in terms of the ‘safety zone’
defined above.
This characterisation allows us to distinguish three ways to introduce the
golden rule:
                                                                                                                                   
18We follow the definitions of the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission: structural is synonymous
with cyclically adjusted and only automatic reactions to the cycle (i.e. those induced by existing legislation) are
considered (see Banca d’Italia (1999) for a review of methodologies and practices). It is common in the
literature to term ‘elasticity’ rather than ‘semi-elasticity’ the relation between point changes in the deficit to
GDP ratio and percentage changes in output.
19Article 104c of the Treaty says that, when the ratio is above 60 per cent of GDP, it must ‘diminish
sufficiently’ and approach 60 per cent ‘at a satisfactory pace’. If the ratio increases, the Excessive Deficits
Procedure begins. It should be noted that, while the Treaty allows exceptions to the 3 per cent deficit criterion,
it does not for the criterion concerning the debt ratio. The implications for stabilisation policy of the interaction
between the deficit and the debt rule are analysed in Balassone and Monacelli (1999). Other relevant issues
concerning the stabilisation function of fiscal policy in EMU are discussed in European Commission (1997).Fiscal Studies
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•   changing the reference parameter;
•   changing the upper limit;
•   changing the medium-term objective.
For each option, both the kind of investment outlays considered and the time-
span to which one refers need to be specified.
The implications of the three types of reform can be explained by looking at
solutions already adopted in some countries or proposed in the debate:
•   The proposal made by Modigliani et al. (1998), suggesting the use of a deficit
net of net investment, represents a reform of the first type.
•   In Germany (article 115 of the Constitution), yearly deficits are allowed up to
the level of gross investment in the federal budget (this includes items that
differ from those considered in the National Accounts
20); the adoption of this
solution at EMU level would represent a reform of the second type.
•   In the UK, public borrowing cannot exceed the level of net investment over
the cycle (HM Treasury, 1997); the adoption of this solution for EMU
member countries would represent a reform of the third type.
To evaluate the consistency of each solution with the objectives of the Treaty
and the Pact, it is useful to refer to Figure 4, where the effects of each proposal
on the structural deficit and on the margins for stabilisation policy are stylised.
The curves show the level of the balance; they are traced assuming a 4 per cent
of GDP difference between the position at the top of the upswing and the
position at the bottom of the downswing (this is assumed to be sufficient for
stabilisation purposes). The straight lines show the limits set to the deficit.
Figure 4(a) depicts the present situation. The two curves refer to a balanced
structural budget and a 1 per cent structural deficit. To simplify the analysis in
the following subsections, reference is made only to the latter situation.
1. Proposal of Modigliani et al.
Changing the reference parameter as proposed by Modigliani et al., the
conditions in (2) would change to
(3) { [DEF – (INV–AMM)]/GDP} t ≤  0.03   ∀ t
{ [DEFs – (INV–AMM)]/GDP} t = 0.01   ∀ t
where INV and AMM are gross investment and amortisation respectively. These
conditions amount to an increase in the upper limit and the medium-term
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FIGURE 4
(a) The Stability Pact
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(c) Golden Rule: The German Model














(d) Golden Rule: The UK Model












objective presently set for the overall deficit. The increase depends on the
country’s level of net investment. In fact, (3) can be rewritten as
(3′ )( DEF/GDP)t ≤  0.03 + [(INV–AMM)/GDP]t   ∀ t
(DEFs/GDP)t = 0.01 + [(INV–AMM)/GDP]t   ∀ t.
The margins for counter-cyclical action are unchanged with respect to (2).
However, this proposal would determine an increase in the structural deficit
which, for high-enough values of net investment, may be incompatible with the
reduction of debt.
Reference to net investment is what a proper application of the dual budget
requires. It has the merit of making the deficit level conditional upon the level of
that part of expenditures that actually can increase a country’s productive
potential.
21 However, it also poses some problems for evaluation: (a)
amortisation would have to be evaluated item by item, with high administrative
costs, and (b) this would be complicated by the fact that public infrastructures
have multiple functions and no market value. Furthermore, the margins for
opportunistic behaviour may widen.
22 These problems are all the more relevant
for the multilateral surveillance procedure.
The use of gross investment would not be in line with the correct application
of a dual budget but would avoid the above-mentioned difficulties. The elements
for the computation of the modified reference parameter (overall deficit and
gross investment) are already available and communicated to the EU by Member
States within the Excessive Deficits Procedure.
23 There would not be extra
administrative costs and the leeway for opportunistic behaviour would be less
pronounced.
24 However, the monitoring of results during the year would become
more difficult.
25
The constraints in (3′ ) would change to
(3″ )( DEF/GDP)t ≤  0.03 + (INV/GDP)t   ∀ t
(DEFs/GDP)t = 0.01 + (INV/GDP)t   ∀ t.
In this case, if gross investment remained at the levels recorded on average over
the last two decades, the resulting structural deficit would not be consistent with
the objective of a sound fiscal stance. In Figure 4(b), two lines are traced
                                                                                                                                   
21On this, see HM Treasury (1998).
22For example, how would one distinguish between maintenance and new investment?
23In the procedure, investment is defined as ‘gross fixed capital formation’.
24It would be different if all capital expenditure were excluded from the deficit. Among these expenditures,
payments aimed at covering current deficits of public enterprises or at settling past debts would be included.
25In several countries, general government accounts are only available on a yearly basis. Monitoring of overall
balances is often based on more readily available financial data (for example, borrowing requirement), which
do not provide indications concerning the composition of balances and, more specifically, investment
expenditure.Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’
223
corresponding to the limits to the overall deficit resulting from the minimum and
maximum value of the gross investment to GDP ratio recorded on average in the
1980–97 period in EU countries (1.9 per cent in the UK and 3.6 per cent in
Spain). The structural deficit would lie between 1.9 and 4.6 per cent of GDP
(considering fluctuation margins respectively equal to 3 and 2 percentage
points).
26 Such values, given the present low-inflation environment, would only
be consistent with the limit set for the debt ratio (60 per cent of GDP) under
sustained real growth rates; for a country with a structural deficit of 3 per cent
and a debt ratio of 60 per cent, growth rates higher than 5 per cent would be
required. For Italy, a nominal growth rate of 4.5 per cent and structural deficit of
3 per cent would imply a debt ratio still at 100 per cent in the year 2010.
2. The German Model
The German model would meet difficulties similar to those mentioned above
from the point of view of multilateral surveillance (again, gross investment is
used). The constraints in (2) would change to
(4) (DEF/GDP)t ≤  (INV/GDP)t   ∀ t
(DEFs/GDP)t = (INV/GDP)t – 0.02   ∀ t
where, as in (3′ ), it is assumed that the change in the upper ceiling of the
reference parameter also determines a change in the medium-term objective
allowing stabilisation policy without breaching the upper limit (the margins are
left unaltered at 2 per cent).
As for the consistency with the objectives of the Treaty and the Pact, if the
same level of expenditure experienced in the past were to prevail in the future,
this solution would not imply a significant change with respect to the present
situation for most EU Member States. On average between 1980 and 1997, the
ratio of gross investment to GDP in EU countries was slightly below 3 per cent;
only in a few countries and for very limited periods of time did it go above 4 per
cent; so, in order to have sufficient margins for counter-cyclical action, most
countries would have to target a structural balance between 0 and 1 per cent of
GDP. In Figure 4(c), two examples are depicted concerning the countries with
the lowest and the highest gross investment to GDP ratio in the EU (again, the
fluctuation margins are set to 2 per cent of GDP).
3. The UK Model
The UK model refers to results over the cycle; thus it appears to be better suited
to be consistent with the objectives of soundness and flexibility of the budget.
Adopting this model in EMU would imply the following constraints:
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(5) (DEF/GDP)t ≤  [(INV–AMM)/GDP]a + 0.02   ∀ t
(DEFs/GDP)t ≤  [(INV–AMM)/GDP]a   ∀ t
where the upper ceiling on the reference parameter has been defined so as to
leave the fluctuation margins for the budget unaltered and [(INV–AMM)/GDP]a
is the average level of the net investment to GDP ratio over the cycle.
The actual determination of the reference period (the length of the cycle) may
encounter some difficulties both on theoretical and on practical grounds. It also
adds to the complexity of the multilateral surveillance process. As already
mentioned, additional problems stem from the reference to net investment.
Depending on the level of net investment, the medium-term target consistent
with the UK model may or may not fall in the ‘safety zone’.
27 In the first case,
the UK model would only differ from the present situation in that a structural
deficit could only be incurred if net investment were under way; it would leave
unaltered both the margins for stabilisation policy and the safeguard of a
structural budget consistent with a sustainable debt level. In the second case,
both objectives could be compromised. Considering the investment undertaken
by EU countries between 1980 and 1997, the structural deficit would lie between
(1.9–x) and (3.6–x), where x = AMM/GDP; these levels are lower than those
allowed by the proposal in Modigliani et al. (1.9–x; 4.6–x), but they could still be
inconsistent with a reduction of the debt ratio.
28 Furthermore, if the 3 per cent
threshold for the overall deficit is kept (Figure 4(d)), net investment larger than 1
per cent would imply shrinking margins for stabilisation policy.
In conclusion, the adoption of the golden rule cannot significantly change the
policy options open to EU countries without conflicting with the objective of a




The Maastricht Treaty defines the soundness of public finances as a necessary
condition for the success of EMU and sets quantitative limits to deficit and debt
in EU member countries. The centralisation of monetary policy and the
impossibility of using the exchange rate as a policy instrument make fiscal
policy all the more important. Indeed, fiscal policy together with structural
policy becomes the main instrument of national economic policy. Fiscal policy
                                                                                                                                   
27In the UK, net investment to GDP is likely to be below 1 per cent (the gross ratio is just above 1 per cent).
28In HM Treasury (1997), a safeguard clause is included for the stability of the debt to GDP ratio over the
economic cycle.
29These problems become more relevant when referring to the overall contribution of public sector outlays to
human and physical capital accumulation. Estimates by Modigliani and Padoa Schioppa Kostoris (1998)
clearly show how high the deficit could reach (see footnote 15) and the complexity of evaluating that
contribution; the latter would be further compounded at the EU level.Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’
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must deal with asymmetric shocks and with situations in which the national
cycle diverges from that of the Union as a whole. This requires sufficient
margins of fluctuation for the budget. In order to avoid flexibility conflicting
with soundness, a structural budget close to balance is called for.
This arrangement is not without problems: (a) the transition to a balanced
budget can have negative effects on conjunctural developments;
30 (b) the long
process of debt reduction brings significant costs in terms of primary surpluses
to current generations; and (c) there is limited scope for using debt in order to
finance investment and this in turn can determine a reduction in investment.
The first problem is undoubtedly relevant. In the event of extremely
unfavourable conjunctural developments, a prudent tuning of the transition may
be considered. However, a large part of the needed adjustment has already been
completed: in 1999, the average deficit in EU countries was 0.6 per cent of GDP,
compared with the 6.2 per cent peak in 1993. It should also be noted that, in
several countries, the interest to GDP ratio tends to decrease as the reduction in
interest rates affects the average cost of debt and as the debt ratio itself declines,
making the needed effort in terms of primary surplus less demanding.
The effect of the transition to a balanced budget could be lessened by
increasing the degrees of competition and flexibility in product and factor
markets. A loosening of the rules designed to govern budgetary policy after the
transition does not seem necessary; it may damage the credibility of the
commitment to sustainable public finances; monetary policy may be called to
take a restrictive stance. Moreover, the golden rule does not help during
downswings: investment decisions only translate into actual expenditure with a
significant delay.
The second problem cannot be avoided. The burden in terms of primary
surplus is the price to pay for gaining budget flexibility and soundness. In some
countries, the reduction of the debt can break the vicious cycle between high
debt and high interest rates which has conditioned economic policy in recent
years (for Italy, see Sartor (1998)). Furthermore, it allows margins for counter-
cyclical action, avoiding the risk that an expansionary policy be perceived as a
threat to sustainability.
31 Finally, it permits tackling, from a sounder financial
position, the coming phase of intense ageing and compensating with lower
interest payments the ensuing increase in expenditure (see, for example, Franco
and Munzi (1997)). If the introduction of the golden rule implied a reduction in
primary surpluses, it could endanger the objectives of soundness and flexibility
set for government budgets.
                                                                                                                                   
30According to the Ecofin decision on 12 October 1998, the objective should be attained by 2002.
31It has been suggested that the effects of expansionary policies diminish with the level of debt and that an
increase in deficit may even have restrictive effects. See, for example, Bertola and Drazen (1993) and Giavazzi
and Pagano (1990 and 1996).Fiscal Studies
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Previous sections have explained how the third problem evolves: a broadly
balanced budget reduces the possibility of spreading investment costs over the
generations benefiting from investment and can negatively affect the investment
level. This effect can be especially relevant during the transition to the low debt
levels consistent with the chosen structural balance. The reduction in deficit
recorded in EU countries in recent years benefited from cuts in investment
spending; in relative terms, these cuts have often been higher than the
corresponding cuts in other items. The problem may be more serious for
countries and regions with a lower stock of public capital. However, a reduction
in investment as measured in the general government accounts should not be too
worrisome since this is not the most appropriate measure of change in public
capital.
Should a golden rule be introduced into the EMU fiscal framework to avoid
the reduction in investment? The analysis above points to a negative answer.
Some of the solutions proposed may be an obstacle to deficit and debt reduction;
others meet practical difficulties, such as the evaluation of amortisation.
Generally, leeway for opportunistic behaviour would increase and the
surveillance of outcomes and trends would be more complex.
Perhaps it is better to search for different solutions. While an exhaustive list
is certainly not the aim of this paper, some ideas can be put forward. At the
national level, one may consider safeguard clauses to avoid fiscal consolidation
efforts translating into investment cuts. The adoption of the UK model at the
national level may be a useful self-discipline mechanism warranting a minimum
level of investment; if the mechanism has no relevance at EU level, no
surveillance problem will arise. In adopting this model, the actual use of the
margins for a structural deficit allowed by the EU fiscal constitution will become
conditional on the realisation of infrastructure. As noted in Section V, in order to
avoid an excessive reduction of the margins for counter-cyclical action and to
make sure that EU fiscal rules are not breached, the structural deficit should not
be above 1 per cent of GDP; this is a modest amount, which should also limit the
relevance of the conceptual problems posed by the dual budget system.
In order to ensure a larger flow of resources available for public investment,
other measures are necessary. For example, especially for smaller projects, the
decentralisation of investment decisions and financing may help to reduce the
disincentive for projects with deferred benefits. At the local community level,
intergenerational altruism may be stronger and people may be more willing to
bear a larger gap between taxes and immediate benefits. More generally, private
capital will have to be involved in funding projects of public interest. Most
infrastructure networks are already the responsibility of institutions and firms
outside general government.Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’
227
REFERENCES
Artis, M. J. and Winkler, B. (1997), ‘The Stability Pact: safeguarding the credibility of the
European Central Bank’, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper no. 1688.
Aschauer, D. A. (1989), ‘Is public expenditure productive?’, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.
23, pp. 177–200.
Balassone, F. and Franco, D. (1999), ‘Public investment in the Stability Pact framework’, in M.
Bordignon and D. Da Empoli (eds), Concorrenza fiscale in un’economia internazionale
integrata, Milano: Franco Angeli.
— and Monacelli, D. (1999), ‘Politiche di stabilizzazione: quali margini nelle regole fiscali della
UE?’, Politica Economica, vol. 15, pp. 309–28.
Banca d’Italia (1999), Indicators of Structural Budget Balances, Roma.
Barro, R. J. (1979), ‘On the determination of public debt’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 87,
pp. 940–71.
Bertola, G. and Drazen, A. (1993), ‘Trigger points and budgetary cuts: explaining the effects of
fiscal austerity’, American Economic Review, vol. 38, pp. 11–26.
Buti, M., Franco, D. and Ongena, H. (1997), ‘Budgetary policies during recessions: retrospective
application of the “Stability and Growth Pact” to the post-war period’, Recherches
Economiques de Louvain, vol. 63, pp. 321–66.
—, — and — (1998), ‘Fiscal discipline and flexibility in EMU: the implementation of the Stability
and Growth Pact’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 81–97.
Colm, G. and Wagner, P. (1963), ‘Some observation on the budget concept’, Review of Economic
Studies, vol. 45, pp. 122–6.
Dalamagas, B. (1995), ‘Growth, public investment and deficit financing’, Australian Economic
Papers, vol. 65, pp. 244–62.
Dalenberg, D. R., Partridge, M. D. and Rickman, D. S. (1998), ‘Public infrastructure: pork or jobs
creator?’, Public Finance Review, vol. 1, pp. 24–52.
De Haan, J., Sturm, J. E. and Sikken, B. J. (1996), ‘Government capital formation: explaining the
decline’, Review of World Economics, vol. 132, pp. 55–74.
de la Fuente, A. (1997), ‘Fiscal policy and growth in the OECD’, Centre for Economic Policy
Research, Discussion Paper no. 1755.
Eberts, R. (1990), ‘Public infrastructure and regional economic development’, Economic Review of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, vol. 26, pp. 15–28.
Eichengreen, B. and Wyplosz, C. (1998), ‘Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?’, Economic
Policy, vol. 26, pp. 67–104.
Erenburg, S. J. (1993), ‘The real effects of public investment on private investment’, Applied
Economics, vol. 25, pp. 831–7.
European Commission (1997), ‘Economic policy in EMU’, Economic Papers, issues 124–5.
Evans, P. and Karras, G. (1994), ‘Is government capital productive? Evidence from a panel of
seven countries’, Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 16, pp. 271–9.
Franco, D. and Munzi, M. T. (1997), ‘Ageing and fiscal policies in the European Union’, in
European Commission, ‘The welfare state in Europe: challenges and reforms’, European
Economy: Reports and Studies, vol. 7, pp. 239–388.
Garcia-Milà, T., McGuire, T. J. and Porter, R. H. (1996), ‘The effect of public capital in state-level
production functions reconsidered’, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 78, pp. 177–80.
Giavazzi, F. and Pagano, M. (1990), ‘Can severe fiscal contractions be expansionary? Tales of two
small European countries’, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper no. 417.Fiscal Studies
228
— and — (1996), ‘Non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy change: international evidence and the
Swedish experience’, Swedish Economic Policy Review, vol. 3, pp. 67–105.
Girard, J., Gruber, H. and Hurst, C. (1994), ‘A discussion of the role of public investment in
economic growth’, Cahiers BEI-EIB Papers, no. 23, pp. 13–19.
—, — and — (1995), ‘Increasing public investment in Europe: some practical consideration’,
European Economic Review, vol. 39, pp. 731–8.
— and Hurst, C. (1994), ‘Investment and growth: quality versus quantity’, Cahiers BEI-EIB
Papers, no. 23, pp. 39–55.
Goode, R. and Birnbaum, E. A. (1955), Government Capital Budgets, Washington, DC:
International Monetary Fund.
Gramlich, E. M. (1994), ‘Infrastructure investment: a review essay’, Journal of Economic
Literature, vol. 32, pp. 1147–75.
HM Treasury (1997), A Code for Fiscal Stability, London.
— (1998), The Public Sector Balance Sheet, London.
Holtz-Eakin, D. (1994), ‘Public sector capital and the productivity puzzle’, Review of Economics
and Statistics, vol. 76, pp. 12–21.
Holzmann, R. (1997), ‘On economic benefits and fiscal requirements of moving from unfunded to
funded pensions’, European Economy, vol. 4, pp. 121–66.
Hurst, C. (1994), ‘Infrastructure and growth: a literature review’, Cahiers BEI-EIB Papers, no. 23,
pp. 57–76.
Kelejian, H. H. and Robinson, D. P. (1997), ‘Infrastructure productivity estimation and its
underlying econometric specification: a sensitivity analysis’, Papers in Regional Science, vol.
72, pp. 297–312.
Kitterer, W. (1994), ‘Tax- versus debt-financing of public investment: a dynamic simulation
analysis’, Kredit und Kapital, vol. 2, pp. 163–87.
Mera, K. (1973), ‘Production functions and social overhead capital: an analysis of the Japanese
case’, Regional and Urban Economics, vol. 3, pp. 297–312.
Modigliani, F., Fitoussi, J. P., Moro, B., Snower, D., Solow, R., Steinherr, A. and Sylos Labini, P.
(1998), ‘Manifesto contro la disoccupazione nell’Unione Europea’, Moneta e Credito, vol. 51,
pp. 375–412.
— and Padoa Schioppa Kostoris, F. (1998), Sostenibilità e solvibilità del debito pubblico in Italia,
Bologna: Il Mulino.
Munnel, A. H. (1992), ‘Infrastructure investment and economic growth’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 6, pp. 189–98.
Musgrave, R. A. (1939), ‘The nature of budgetary balance and the case for a capital budget’,
American Economic Review, vol. 29, pp. 260–71.
Oxley, H. and Martin, J. P. (1991), ‘Controlling government spending and deficits: trends in the
80s and prospects for the 90s’, OECD Economic Studies, vol. 17, pp. 145–89.
Pontolillo, V. (1998), ‘Aspetti economico-istituzionali del project financing: problematiche ed
esperienze in Italia’, Banca d’Italia, Documenti, no. 589.
Poterba, J. M. (1995), ‘Capital budgets, borrowing rules and state capital spending’, Journal of
Public Economics, vol. 56, pp. 165–87.
Premchand, A. (1983), Government Budgeting and Expenditure Controls: Theory and Practice,
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Ratner, J. B. (1983), ‘Government capital and the production function for U.S. private output’,
Economics Letters, vol. 13, pp. 213–17.Public Investment, the Stability Pact and the ‘Golden Rule’
229
Robinson, M. (1998), ‘Measuring compliance with the golden rule’, Fiscal Studies, vol. 19, pp.
447–62.
— (1999), ‘The role and nature of public sector balance sheets’, Queensland University of
Technology, Discussion Papers in Economics, Finance and International Competitiveness no.
49.
Roubini, N. and Sachs, J. D. (1989), ‘Government spending and budget deficits in the industrial
countries’, Economic Policy, vol. 8, pp. 99–132.
Sartor, N. (ed.) (1998), Il risanamento mancato — La politica di bilancio italiana: 1986–90,
Roma: Carocci.
Steve, S. (1972), Lezioni di scienza delle finanze, Padova: Cedam.
van Ewijk, C. (1997), ‘Infrastructure, intergenerational conflict and the golden rule of finance’, De
Economist, vol. 145, pp. 447–60.